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Evidence
Evidence; admissibility of evidence pertaining to animal
experimentation--products liability actions against automakers
Evidence Code § 1159 (new).
AB 3691 (Gotch); 1992 STAT. Ch. 188
Under existing law, all relevant evidence' is admissible in any
action, except as otherwise provided for by statute.2 Chapter 188
prohibits the admission 3 of any evidence relating to live animal
1. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1966) (defining relevant evidence); see also 1 B.E.
WriN, CALEOPRNIA EVIDENCE §§ 309-310 (3d. ed. 1986 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the tests courts
utilize in determining relevancy).
2. CAL. Evtn. CODE § 351 (West 1966); see id, § 352 (West 1966) (leaving the ultimate
question of whether to admit or exclude evidence to the discretion of the trial judge); see also id. §
1151 (West 1966) (prohibiting the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove
negligence or culpable conduct); id. § 1152(a) (West Supp. 1992) (excluding evidence of compromise
offers to prove liability of the person making the offer); id. § 1152.5(a) (West Supp. 1992)
(prohibiting the introduction of evidence deriving from mediation procedures); id. § 1155 (West
1966) (excluding by statute evidence that a person was insured at the time a harn was suffered by
another to prove negligence or other wrongdoing of the person). See generally 6 CAL. L. REv.
COMMN', introduction to art. V, at 607 (1964) (stating that statutes exclude certain types of evidence
for reasons of public policy, even though the evidence is relevant and reliable).
3. See CAL. EViD. CODE § 353(a) (West 1966) (requiring that there appear on the record an
objection to admission of evidence for a verdict or judgment to be set aside because of an erroneous
admission of evidence); id. § 353(b) (West 1966) (requiring a court to find that the erroneous
admission of evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice before a verdict or judgment may be set
aside for erroneous admission of evidence); see also Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co., 71 Cal. App. 3d
841, 853, 139 Cal. Rptr. 888, 895 (1977) (holding that a miscarriage of'justice occurs whenever it
is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached absent
the admission of the evidence).
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experimentation' in any product liability action involving motor
vehicles.5
JSP
4. See generally 19,000 Animals Killed in Animal Crash Tests, N.Y. TME S, Sept. 28,1991,
at 26 (reporting that General Motors spokespersons admit that GM is the only automobile
manufacturer which utilizes live animals in experiments that include skin-shredding, chest injury and
polluting the animals' lungs with auto emissions); Richard Willing, 20,000Animals Killed in Decade
of GM Safety Tests, Tn D-rRorr NEws, Sept. 27, 1991 at Al (noting that, although other
automobile makers have ceased using live animals in safety tests, they do have access to GM's test
results); Mark Vaughn, Animal Rights Group Dogs Automaker Over Safety Tests, But Are Critics of
GM Barking Up Wrong Tree, AuToWEEK, Oct. 28, 1991, at 14 (presenting both sides of the debate
over whether or not GM should discontinue its use of live animals in safety tests).
5. CAL. EvM. CODE § 1159(a) (enacted by Chapter 188). Chapter 188 applies only to actions
commenced after January 1, 1993. IL § 1159(b) (enacted by Chapter 188). See generally Ralph
Frammolino, Wilson Signs Law Barring Animal Test Evidence, L.A. TINIES, July 15, 1992, at B2
(reporting on the passage of Chapter 188). Whether Chapter 188 will operate to prohibit the
introduction of such evidence in federal diversity actions depends on whether Chapter 188 is
interpreted as a pure rule of evidence or as a substantive rule. See Barron v. Ford Motor Co., 965
F.2d 195, 203 (7th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing a pure rule of evidence, like a rule of procedure, from
a substantive rule); Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. 540 F.2d 837, 838 (5th Cir. 1976)
(stating in dictum that a state rule that allowed the introduction of a spouse's remarriage in a
wrongful death action was an evidentiary rule so bound up with substantive law that federal courts
were required to follow the state rule); John Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv.
693, 721,724-5 (1974) (defining a procedural rule as one which makes the process of litigation a fair
and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes, and defining a substantive rule as that which
is designed to fulfill some purpose not having to do with fairness or efficiency of the litigation
process); see also County of San Diego v. Department of Health Scrvs., 1 Cal. App. 4th 656, 661,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256, 259 (1991) (stating the general rule that a court may look to committee analyses
to determine legislative intent); SENATE COMMfTrEE ON JUDIcIARY, CorMIrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB
3691 (June 16, 1992) (stating that the purpose of Chapter 188 is to remove incentives for car
manufacturers to utilize live animals in crash testing of vehicles). But see FED. R. EvID. 402
(providing that all relevant evidence is admissible in federal district courts, except as otherwise
provided in the Federal Rules of Evidence); Fasanaro v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 687 F. Supp. 482,
484, 486 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding in a products liability action that Rule 407 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove culpable conduct,
is rationally capable of classification as procedural, and that it applies in diversity actions over
contrary California law); Gibbs v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 423, 428 (9th Cir. 1976)
(restating a well-supported rule that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissability of
evidence in diversity cases). See generally Olin Wellborn, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Application of State Law in Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REv. 371, 401-02 (1977) (suggesting that
the history of the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates a Congressional intent to subject
the Rules of Evidence to the strictures of the Rules Enabling Act, namely that they cannot enlarge,
abridge or modify any substantive right); Brian Redmond, Federal Rules of Evidence or State
Evidentiary Rules as Applicable in Diversity Cases, 84 A.LR. 283, 297, 301 (1987 & Supp. 1992)
(reviewing the divergent views reached by the Circuit Courts of Appeal on the application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in diversity actions when conflicting state evidence rules are arguably
substantive).
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Evidence
Evidence; psychotherapist-patient privilege
Evidence Code § 1010 (amended).
AB 3035 (Polanco); 1992 STAT. Ch. 308
Under existing law, confidential communications' between a
patient 2 and a psychotherapist 3 are privileged.4 Chapter 308
expands the definition of psychotherapist to include registered nurses
who possess a master's degree in psychiatric mental health nursing.'
DHT
1. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 1012 (West Supp. 1992) (defining confidential communication
between patient and psychotherapist); People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 618, 789 P. 2d 127, 151,268
Cal. Rptr. 399, 423 (1990) (providing that previous communications to psychotherapist are not
amenable to the patient-psychotherapist privilege if later communications are made to third person
in a nonprivileged situation) cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 442 (1990); Lovett v. Superior Court, 203 Cal.
App. 3d 521,527, 250 Cal. Rptr. 25, 29 (1988) (holding that statements made during group therapy
comes within patient-psychotherapist privilege); cf Luhdorffv. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 485,
490, 212 Cal. Rptr. 516, 518 (1985) (holding that communications made by patients to persons
necessary to assist psychiatrists or psychologists in treatment of patient's psychiatric problems fall
within the penumbra of psychotherapist-patient privilege).
2. See CAL. EViD. CODE § 1011 (West 1966) (defining patient); see also In re Daniel C.H.,
220 Cal. App. 3d 814, 829, 269 Cal. Rptr. 624, 632 (1990) (upholding application of psychotherapist-
patient privilege to an attorney of an alleged child molestation victim); Grosslight v. Superior Court,
72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 507, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278, 281 (1977) (stating that communications between the
parents of a child defendant and a psychiatrist were covered by the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
3. See CAL. EVlD. CODE § 1010 (amended by Chapter 308) (defining therapist to include
psychologists, clinical social workers, school psychologists, marriage, family, and child counselors,
psychological assistants, associate clinical social workers, psychological interns, and supervised
trainees).
4. IL § 1014(a) (West Supp. 1992); cf id. § 954 (West Supp. 1992) (providing privilege for
communications between attorney and client); id § 970 (West 1966) (providing privilege not to
testify against spouse); id § 994 (West Supp. 1992) (providing attorney-client privilege); id § 1032
(West 1966) (providing that communications between clergyman and penitent are privileged); cf KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 422A.0507 (Michie 1980) (creating a psychotherapist-patient privilege). But see
CAL EVmD. CODE §§ 1016-1026 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992) (setting forth exceptions to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege); i § 1024 (West 1966) (providing that psychotherapist-patient
privilege does not exist if the psychotherapist has reason to believe that the patient poses a threat to
himself or another, and if disclosure of that information is necessary to prevent possible future
violence); Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 442, 551 P. 2d 334, 347, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976) (concluding that the policy in favor of protecting confidential
communications between patient and psychotherapist must yield when necessary to prevent harm
from occurring to others); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 439, 467 P. 2d 557, 573, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829,
845 (1970) (holding that a person who admitted in a deposition that he had previously received
psychological treatment had partially waived right to keep past psychological data confidential).




Vehicle Code § 40808 (new); § 40803 (amended).
AB 3659 (Horcher); 1992 STAT. Ch. 538
Under prior law, evidence gained from a speed trap1 could not be
used in trial for a person charged with violating the Vehicle Code. 2
Chapter 538 provides that evidence from speed traps can be excluded
only for prosecutions of speeding violations.3
EB
1. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 40802(a)(h) (West Supp. 1992) (defining speed trap). See generally
People v. Beamer, 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 874, 279 P.2d 205 (1955); In re Beamer, 133 Cal. App.
2d 63, 283 P.2d 356 (1955) (discussing whether the original definition of a speed trap included the
use of an electromagnetic radar speed meter); James H. Kneeht Jr., Note, Evidence - Automobiles -
Radar Speedmeters, 29 S. CAL. L. REv. 240 (1956) (discussing the holding of Beamer, and the use
of radar and speed traps).
2. CA. VEIl. CODE § 40803(a) (amended by Chapter 538); see People v. Miller, 90 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 35, 36, 153 Cal. Rptr. 192, 193 (1979) (holding that evidence from radar was
admissible because the section of the highway on which the defendant was caught was not a speed
trap). See generally Fleming v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 344, 349, 238 P. 88, 89-90 (1925)
(upholding the constitutionality of California's first laws prohibiting speed traps in order to eliminate
clandestine methods of law enforcement); William P. Clancy Jr., Note, Criminal Law: Admissibility
of Evidence Obtained by Radar Speed Meter, 43 CAL. L. REv. 710, 711-19 (1955) (discussing the
history and reasoning behind speed trap laws in California and other states, and problems with the
use of radar and defining speed traps); Recent Decision, Motor Vehicles: Validity of the Speed Trap
Law, 14 CAL. L. REv. 142, 142-43 (1925) (discussing the Fleming decision).
3. CAL. VEI. CODE § 40803(a) (amended by Chapter 538); see People v. Sullivan, 234 Cal.
App. 3d 56, 57-58, 285 Cal. Rptr. 553, 554 (1991) (finding that evidence from a speed trap could
be admitted into court in any prosecution that was consistent with Proposition 8).
Pacific Law JournalVol. 24
